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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Iowa farmers are like other farmers in the United 
States or elsewhere in the world; they face continuous 
risky situations in their farming operations and decisions. 
Risk Attitudes 
How Iowa farmers make decisions under risky situations 
is of paramount importance not only to farmers themselves 
but also to all others concerned. How they decide the 
resulting behavior depends upon how they assign the serious­
ness or probability to a risky situation and how they 
personally feel (like or dislike) about the risky situations. 
Some of them do not want any risk, while some may enjoy the 
risk and others may care only slightly about risk. Most of 
them are likely to lie between the one who does not want 
risk at all and the one who cares little about risk. The 
degree to which farmers like or dislike risk is to be called 
"the risk attitude" in this study. 
Kinds of Uncertainty 
There are four kinds of risk or uncertainty arising 
from the farming business [11, 35]. First, the price 
uncertainty; farmers do not generally know the price of a 
product they will sell in the future. They have to wait 
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one season for the seasonal crops, a year for the annual 
crop, years for the cattle, and for many years for fruit 
trees. The distant future prices are very uncertain to 
farmers who have no control over prices. Second., natures 
uncertainties; farmers are at the mercy of nature. A 
successful agricultural production needs favorable natural 
conditions; this can not easily be predicted correctly or 
controlled. Many well-to-do farmers are reduced to poverty 
following successive unfavorable natural conditions. Third 
is the institutional uncertainty; the institutional change 
can directly or. indirectly affect farmers. For example, 
changes in U.S. grain exporting to the U.S.S.R. may cause 
many changes in domestic grain prices which directly effect 
net farm income of the farmers. Last, the technological un­
certainty, the fact that agriculture is dynamic, continuous 
new technology in the form of seeds, insecticides, machinery, 
etc. The consequences of these new inputs lead to great 
uncertainty for the farmer. For instance, machinery may be­




With all of the previously mentioned uncertain situa­
tions that farmers face, farmers have to make correct 
decisions and successfully decide what to do and how to 
cope with management problems. How Iowa farmers make 
decisions and manage risky situations is not definitely 
known. It is important for the public, government decision­
makers, and Iowa farmers themselves, to be informed about 
the response and behavior in such risky situations. One 
way to help understand how Iowa farmers behave when faced 
with uncertainty, is to know quantitatively their risk 
attitude. 
The risk attitude is very abstract. It is only a 
feeling of an individual farmer which is not measurable in 
material units. However, science needs measurement, and 
science without measurement can hardly (or not at all) be 
useful. Therefore, a serious attempt must be made to 
measure this risk attitude. 
A better understanding of the Iowa farmer is possible 
when there is further investigation of what factors affect 
their risk attitudes. An attempt, therefore, should be 
made to find out how much each factor affects the attitude. 
There can be many factors responsible for the risk 
attitude among Iowa farmers. Some of these are, education 
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background, size of farm and size of his assets, age of 
the farmer, size of family, etc. 
In brief, the main focus of this study will center 
around the measurement of risk attitudes of farmers in 
Story County, Iowa and an investigation of what and how 
many factors affect these attitudes. 
Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate 
the stated problems and find solutions for them. Therefore, 
these main objectives may be listed; 
(1) To measure the risk attitude of selected farmers 
in Story County, Iowa; 
(2) To identify socio-economic factors that affect the 
risk attitudes of the selected farmers; 
(3) And, also, an attempt to measure the degree of 
effect of socio-economic factors upon risk 
attitudes. 
These three objectives can not be reached without 
passing through the steps of research procedures. By doing 
so, it creates other secondary objectives of the study. 
They will be represented as follows : 
(1) There is no published information on risk atti­
tudes of the farmer; this suggests that the primary 
data must be obtained. This state suggests that 
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the needed objective is to select farmers for 
sampling, construct questionnaires for these 
selected farmers, and conduct field investigation, 
using these selected farmers. 
(2) An investigation into the theoretical framework 
of this study is then possible. One way is to 
use the utility functions. Therefore, another 
objective is to outline the theoretical framework 
of the utility function and to show how the 
utility function may lead to the estimation of 
the risk attitude. 
(3) A deep consideration of what factors affect the 
risk attitude can be undertaken. 
(4) Besides the data from (1) and the theoretical 
framework from (2), it is necessary to identify 
the analytical procedures and methods which 
are most appropriate. Thus, the last objective 
is to select and describe the analytical method. 
An explanation of utility function estimation and 
the statistical ordinary least square (OLS) method, 
is felt necessary. 
In brief, the objectives of this study are to study 
the risk attitudes of Iowa farmers, identify the factors 
affecting these attitudes, and any other related or desired 
objectives of this research. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
An economic study of risk attitudes and the resulting 
human behavior when faced with risky situations, has been 
recognized relatively recently. We will divide the approach 
into four categories; i.e., direct application of the 
utility function, observation of how farmers manage input 
demand, the experimental method, and mathematical risk 
programming. 
Direct Application of the 
Utility Function 
This kind of utility function defining the ordinal 
utility of a farmer, is a function of the income or wealth 
or both, U = U(Y), where U is the ordinal utility and Y 
is the income which is the argument of the function. From 
this function, there are generally five measurable concepts 
of the risk attitude. They are; (1) the second derivative 
of the utility function of U"(Y), (2) the negative of the 
second derivative of the utility function divided by the 
first derivative of the utility function or -U"(Y)/U*(Y), 
(3) the derivative of the expected income with respect to 
the variance of the income or 9EY/96^, (4) the 3EY/9ô^, 
with expected utility or EU constant, and (5) the risk 
premium, TT. 
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The decision-makers are classified as the risk averse, 
the risk neutral, and the risk preference. These classifi­
cations are based on the above five measurable concepts. 
The risk averse farmer has the following character­
istics, 
(1) U"(Y) < 0 
(2) 9EU/36^ < 0 
(3) -U"(y)/U'(Y) > 0 
and 
(4) 9EY/96^ with EU constant > 0 
(5) TT > 0 
The risk preference farmer has the inequality signs 
reversed from the risk averse farmer.. The risk neutral 
farmer has the equality signs instead of the inequality 
signs. 
The expression of U"(Y) < 0 simply based on the general 
economic assumption that the marginal utility of money is 
diminishing. 
The measuring, concept of -U"(Y)/U' (Y) was contributed 
by Pratt [58] . This concept developed from the fact that 
the utility function is the ordinal concept which has the 
characteristics of the monotonie transformation. The new 
concept of Pratt provides the unique measurement of these 
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transformable functions. He called this concept the abso­
lute risk measurement, and he developed another concept of 
the risk measurement which is defined as [-U"(Y)/U'(Y)]Y, 
which he called the relative risk measurement. 
2 
The method of the measurement of 3EY/9 6 with EU 
constant is contributed by Magnusson [45]. This tells the 
substitution between the expected income and the risk with 
keeping the expected utility constant. The keeping EU 
constant is the significant importance of this method. 
If not so, the actual or real substitution effect between 
2 EY and 96 cannot be found because the change of EY or 
2 the change of <S will automatically lead to the change 
of EU too. 
The expression of IT > 0 means that the risk averse 
farmer is willing to pay the maximum amount of TT in order 
to avoid the risky situations. 
The examples of this method of the study are the 
works done by Dillon and Scandizzo [16], Francisco and 
Anderson [22], Halter and Mason [29], Lin et al. [44], 
and Officer and Halter [56], Benito [8], Masson [51] and 
Roumasset [59] . 
The direct application of the utility function is 
characterized by using the primary data obtained through 
the interview technique. This gives higher doubt about the 
validity of this type of study. 
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The use of the utility function plus the interview 
technique is being attacked by the following arguments. 
(1) Biased by the interview technique. For example, 
if the interviewers are risk averse, they may use 
the language indirectly to convince the farmers to 
agree with them. This leads Binswanger [9] to 
develop the experimental method. 
(2) Hypothetical risky situations given to the farmers 
may not be a good representation of the real 
situation, i.e., the answer the farmer gives may 
not be his choice in an actual farming business 
decision. 
(3) The hypothetical risky situations themselves 
represent a gambling characteristic. The farmers 
may have personal values against gambling which 
would lead them to select the hypothetical risky 
situations with the risk averse expression. But, 
in reality, the farmer does not feel that the 
farming business is a gamble and he may prefer 
risk preference. 
(4) When farmers make decisions in actual situations, 
they may not rely on monetary considerations 
alone. Therefore, the risk attitude derived from 
the utility function as a function of money alone 
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may not work in reality. 
(5) The selected form of the utility function may lead 
to inappropriate implications and conclusions 
as pointed out by Lin and Chang [43] . 
(6) Farmers answering the questionnaire do not have 
to take the consequences for decisions based upon 
the hypothetical situations of the questionnaire. 
Also, they do not have much time to make their 
decisions. In reality, their actual decisions 
may be based upon discussion with family members 
and allow the farmer more time to weigh his deci­
sions. This also led Binswanger [9] to develop 
the experimental method. 
In a comparative study of many methods by Lin et al. 
[43], they concluded that this direct application of the 
utility function was the poorest method for predicting 
farmers behavior when dealing with actual risky farm situa­
tions . 
This study selected this method of study because there 
is no evidence showing which method is the best one or 
that any method is superior to the others. There is more 
discussion about this method and the theory related in 
the following two chapters. 
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The Experimental Method 
So far, there has only been one study in this category, 
this was done by Binswanger [9]. He developed this method 
in order to improve the interview technique with the use 
of the hypothetical risky situations. 
However, social science can use the experimental method 
with some amount of limitation. In the study by Binswanger, 
the experiment was limited to only zero gain or no loss to 
the selected farmers in India. The experiment was based on 
pure gambling. Therefore, this does not represent the real 
agricultural risk which does not limit it to zero gain, and 
farmers do not see their farming businesses as gambling. 
It is uncertain whether this method is or is not better 
than the interview method but it is certain that it requires 
more research funding. The writer of this study personally 
does not believe that the experimental method is better 
than the interview method. 
The Observation Method 
In general, this method observes the farmers behavior 
in reference to input demand. The theoretical framework 
of this method is as follows. 
Let U = U(Y) where Y is the net farm income, i.e., 
EU = EU(E(Y),ô^), where 6^ or 6^Y is a variance of Y. 
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2 
Let Y be a function of the input N, i.e., 6 Y is also the 
function of the input N, so, 
EU = EU(E(Y(N)),6^(N)) 
A farmer maximizes the EU by finding the optimum 
amount of N that should be used, i.e., the equation is 
differentiated with respect to N and equated to zero: 
. 2  dEU _ 9EU SE(Y) . 9EU 9 6 _ „ 
dN BE (Y) 9N gg2 9N " 
9 EU 
3E(Y) . 95^ . 96^ _ 
9N 9EU 9N 
9E(Y) 
This is the same as 9EY/9ô^, with EU 
95"^ dE(Y) agZ 
constant given in the section giving the direct application 
of the utility function. 
The expression of 9E(Y)/9N is nothing more than the 
expected marginal value product less the expected marginal 
factor cost.^ Therefore, the equation above may be 
^The total net farm income Y equals the total gross 
income TR less the total cost TC, or, 
Y = TR - TC 
putting expectation sign, then, 
E(Y) = E(TR) - E(TC) 
Let N be an input, so, 
Hill = E(MVP) - E (MFC) . 
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rewritten as, 
E(MVP - MFC) + ^ Q 
96 ^ 
This expression may be graphically explained as 
follows 
dollar 
the effect of ôE(Y)/ôô 
MFC or E(MFC) 
E(MVP) 
the quantity of input N 
Figure 1. Showing the amount of input used under risk 
In the above figure, the risk makes the risk averse 
farmer use less input, OX^, than the case without risk, OXg. 
The effect of 8E(Y)/9 6^ is shown in the graph too. 
2 
This method involves finding the value of 3E(Y)/3 6 , 
2 given the known values of E(MVP) and 95 /9N. A detailed 
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discussion and example is given by Anderson et al. [1], 
A more in-depth theoretical discussion of this method can 
be found in Magnusson [45]. 
Based upon this framework. Pope [57] has proposed the 
econometric approach to estimate the risk attitude coeffi­
cients. Moscardi and de Janvry [54] utilized this method 
within the safety first framework. 
This method escapes the criticism of using the utility 
function, which is constructed from the hypothetical risky 
situation. However, this method has serious defects 
also, since it always measures the risk attitude coefficients 
from the difference between the actual level of input used 
and the theoretical no risk model (or risk neutral). As a 
result, it always indicates the risk averse by the farmers. 
But their difference is not necessarily caused only by the 
risk aversion of the farmers. In fact, there are many 
explanations for that difference, such as; farmers may not 
have sufficient capital to use as much input of EMFC = 
EMVP, farmers may not maximize net farm income alone, and 
farmers may not have enough information about EMVP. 
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The Mathematical Risk Programming 
Method 
This method is a subclassification of the observation 
method, by looking at the supply side. It sees what the 
farmers plan to do for their cropping pattern. 
The mathematical risk programming uses the risk atti­
tude coefficients in the model. If the risk attitude is 
rightly specified, the mathematical risk programming should 
simulate the farm plan which is like the plan made by the 
farmer. 
The following model will illustrate how the risk attitude 
coefficient is needed for the risk programming model. 
As we know, EU = EU(EY,6^(Y)) 
where 
2 2 Y is the net income, 6 or 5 (Y) is a variance of Y. 
The simple function stands for the above EU [see Heifner, 
36], I.e., 
EU = Y - b5^ 
where b is the parameter. Note that "b" indicates how a 
farmer views risk; the risk neutral farmer has b = 0, the 
risk averse has b > 0 and b < 0 for the case of the-risk 
lover. 
Taking total differentiation with dEU = 0 
o = dY - bdô^ = 0, 
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2 
i.e., ^  = g or dY/dgZ = b 
Hence, b is nothing more than one kind of coefficient 
measuring the risk attitude. The problem is to use the 
risk programming to find out this value of b. 
For the example, one type of risk programming which 
is the quadratic risk programming will be used, 
i.e., to maximize Z = cx - bx'vx, subject to all constraints. 
Where c and x are vectors of the net price and the 
activity level of the farm plan, x'vx is the variance-
covariance matrix of the activities. Value b must be 
given arbitrarily. For each given value of b, there will 
be the farm plan solution that maximizes the value of Z. 
Various values of b may be tried for the problem, therefore, 
various farm plans are simulated. Now, select the farm 
plan solution which is most like the plan which is actually 
used by the farmer. The value of b from this selected 
plan solution is the estimate of the actual b that the farmer 
actually has in mind. 
In practice, the model used for finding the value of 
the risk attitude coefficients is more complicated. Examples 
of risk programming are found in Brink and McCarl [12], which 
used MOTAD linear programming [Hazell, 32] and the work of 
Hazell and Scandizzo [33] is also a good example. 
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Other Methods 
There are other methods which developed but are not 
popularly used. For example, Johnson [38] used the economic 
anthropology approach for the poor peasants in Brazil. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Perfect and Imperfect Knowledge 
Economic study may be viewed in two related areas. 
One deals with the situation of the perfect knowledge; 
this is the situation when all needed information is known 
ahead of time; therefore, the economic decision can be done 
perfectly right. For example, if a farmer knows exactly 
what the marginal value product of his fertilizer input 
MVP, and he knows the price of the fertilizer, then he can 
decide exactly what amount of fertilizer he should apply in 
his field in order to maximize his profit (by equating MVP 
to a price). In other words, one is able to obtain the opti­
mum decision when he has the perfect information. 
Another area of economics deals with the situation of 
the imperfect knowledge. There can be the case whereby all 
information needed exists, but the decision-maker is not 
aware of, or when the needed information does not exist 
at all. For example, a farmer can not know what the price 
of corn will be when sold, at the time he starts planting 
corn. Therefore, a farmer has to take the risk or un­
certainty of corn prices while he begins his corn season. 
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Risk and Uncertainty 
The situation under the imperfect knowledge will always 
be associated with the concepts of risk and uncertainty. 
These two concepts were first defined by F. H. Knight in 
1919 [40]. He concluded that if the situation could be 
described by the objective probability it was called the 
uncertainty, if not it was called risk. In 1954, L. J. 
Savage [62] redefined those two concepts just the opposite 
of what Knight did. At present, the definitions by Savage 
are generally accepted by economists. 
The concept of the probability has broadened; it now 
includes not only the objective probability but also the 
subjective probability, and one can see that almost every 
imperfect knowledge situation can be described by either sub­
jective or objective probability or both, therefore, every 
situation may be viewed as risk. This may leave very few 
situations to be classified under the uncertainty. However, 
few people exercise care and observe how these two concepts 
are defined, therefore, both are generally used inter­
changeably.^ 
^This study follows the general, i.e., it does not view 
the serious difference of these two concepts. 
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The Utility Function 
The utility function is the key to this study. Most of 
the discussion about this function will be represented in 
this section. 
A. Marshall was the first to introduce the concept of 
the utility [49]. His concept of the utility was obviously 
the cardinal concept [18, 28], and it had been used as 
introduced for a long period of time. Very recently, the 
utility has been thought of as the ordinal concept [37, 48, 
55, 62]. This study also takes the utility concept as the 
ordinal utility. 
The first form of the utility function is used for 
consumers. By this form, the utility U is a function of 
all goods Xi's. It explains that a consumer buys goods be­
cause he can consume the utility in the goods. The typical 
application of this form is to maximize the consumer's 
satisfaction by consuming quantities of goods Xi's, subject 
to his budget constraint, i.e., to maximize 
U = U(Xi, i=l,2,...,n) 
subject to the given budget. 
This type of function is known as the direct utility 
function. It has the great application into the modern 
economics, e.g., the estimation of the demand curve, the 
extension into the indirect utility function, the price 
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and income policy theory, and so on. 
The second form of the utility function which developed 
from the first one is applied to the producer. By this form, 
the utility U is a function of working income and leisure. 
It sees that the producer gets the satisfaction from the 
leisure and income from working. The typical problem of 
this kind is, 
to maximize U = U(Y,L) 
subject to the given amount of time which a producer has 
during a certain period of time. Where Y is the amount of 
the working income and L is the amount of leisure time or 
negative amount of working time. 
The solution of the above problem is to allocate the 
working time for money Y, and the leisure time L in such 
a way that a producer may get the maximum utility. If the 
leisure is kept constant at L, this type of the utility 
function may be written as, 
U = U(Y) or U = U(Y,L) 
or utility is a function of the income alone. 
The above form of U = U(Y) will be the standard form 
used in this entire study. 
This ordinal utility is one of function which is very 
difficult to deal with. Because it is the ordinal number, 
i.e., it is relatively difficult to be estimated, it has no 
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standard of measuring units of utility which enables com­
parison among individuals. However, the subsequent sections 
will discuss the way to overcome those problems and how the 
risk attitude of farmers can be derived from this kind of 
the ordinal utility function. 
Construction of the Utility 
Index 
The utility functions are constructed for each of the 
selected Iowa farmers, using the net farm income as the 
argument. The method used is known as the trial method 
of contract reference method [29]. 
By this method, and by this study, a farmer is told to 
imagine that he is doing his farming business with two 
possible outcomes of his net farm income. One is worth 
one and one half time his last year's farm income with 
probability P; another outcome is worth only one half 
of his last year's net farm income with probability of 1-P. 
Then, a farmer is requested to think further that he 
may or may not like those risky situations. If there is 
someone else who will take those risky situations for the 
farmer, and will let the farmer do his farming as usual, the 
farmer is requested to certify the least amount of sure 
dollars that a farmer will ask to sell out of those risky 
situations. An attempt is made to make it clear to a 
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farmer that this least amount of sure dollars means the farmer 
does not see the difference whether he will take his own 
risky situations or let someone pay him the sure dollars in 
order to take over the risky situations. 
Calculation of the utility index is not complicated. 
Assuming the number of the utility index is within the 
range of 0 and 100 (it can be within any range). The 
value of the one and one half times the net farm income, 
or X, is assigned to be 100, and the value of the half times 
the net farm income or Y is assigned to be zero. Then the 
utility index is calculated as, 
U = 100(P) + o(l-P) 
Note that the values of the lower and the higher index 
numbers are assigned depends upon the arbitrary range of 
the index number. For instance, the required range of the 
index number may be zero to 5,000 or 100 to 500, and so on. 
These ranges have no actual meaning; they are ordinal 
numbers. 
For illustration, let the net farm income be $10,000. 
Therefore, the two outcomes are X = $15,000 and Y = $5,000 
with the probability P and 1-P, respectively. Then, the 
values of P and 1-P are 90% and 10%, 80% and 20%, and so on 
up to 10% and 90%, and a farmer is asked to certify the 
least amount or the certainty equivalent accordingly. 
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The following table lists hypothetical values of X and Y 
with the associated probabilities, the dollars of the 
certainty equivalent, the utility index and the expected value 
of the risky situation. The expected value of the risky 
situation is calculated as PX + (l-P)Y; this expected value 
is given in order to show that the risk averse farmers al­
ways have the certainty equivalent dollars less than the 
expected value of the risky situation. 
Table 1. Examples of values of the certainty equivalent, 
the utility index and others 
P of X, 
X=$15,000 











100% 0% 15,000 100 15,000 
90% 10% 14,000 90 14,000 
80% 20% 13,000 80 13,000 
70% 30% 10,500 70 12,000 
60% 40% 10,000 60 11,000 
50% 50% 9,000 50 10,000 
40% 60% 8,000 40 9,000 
30% 70% 7,000 30 8,000 
20% 80% 6,500 20 7,000 
10% 90% 6,000 10 6,000 
0% 100% 5,000 0 5,000 
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The figures in this table are presented graphically 
in Figure 2. 
Utility index 
100 
9 0  
.. 80 




3 0  
20 
10 
$ of certainty 
equivalent 
the expected values 
•*c. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
thousand dollars 
Figure 2. Showing the possible relationship of the 
utility index and the certainty equivalent 
values 
Types of the Risk 
Attitude 
In most cases, a farmer does not know exactly what 
his net farm income will be at planning stages of the 
seasonal operation. He has to use an estimation of his net 
income. The estimation can hardly be correct, but 
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has a certain number of variability in the estimation 
itself. Generally, the farmer does not like this risk or 
this variability of the expected net farm income. How­
ever, some farmers may like the risk and some may not care 
about the risk at all. 
People are broadly classified into three categories 
as to how they feel about risk; they are, risk averse, 
risk preference, and risk neutral. Each of these may be 
further subdivided as their risk attitude changes or 
their wealth changes. 
(1) Risk averse; Risk averse people are those who 
get disutility from risk; therefore, they try to 
avoid risk. This is the case with most farmers. 
(2) Risk neutral; These people ignore risk. In 
other words, they do not feel different in situa­
tions with or without risk. 
(3) Risk preference: They are said to be in this 
group if they can get positive utility out of 
risk. These are people who are found in 
gambling places. 
Some farmers subscribe to a mix of two or all three 
categories. For instance, the farmer may have a risk 
preference at the small amount of money and risk averse 
at the large amount of money. 
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Types of the risk attitude can be very illustrative 
when they are discussed with the help of either the utility 
function or the expected utility concept. 
Types of Risk and the Expected 
Utility Function 
The expected utility function may be derived from the 
known utility function. 
Let the utility function be 
U = U(Y), or the utility U is a function of the 
income Y. 
Apply Taylor's expansion around the mean Y and trun­
cated after the second term assuming the rest is too small 
to be of any significance.^ 
E[U] = E[U{Y) + (Y-Y)U'(Y) + j (Y-Y)^U"(Y)] 
where U* and U" are the first and second derivatives of U 
= U(Y) + E(y-y)U'(Y) + | E(Y-Y)^U'(Y) 
= U(Y) + 0 + J g^YU"(Y) 
where 
2 2 6 Y = E[Y-Y] or variance of Y, 
^For example, the expansion of f(Y) around "a" is, 
f(Y) = f(a) + (Y-a)f'(a) + ^ (Y-a)^f"(a) + ... . 
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so, E[U] = U(Y) + J 6^YU"(Y) 
So, the expected utility is a function of the expected 
income and the variance of income [43]. Now, types of 
the risk attitude may be explained within the space of the 
expected income and the variance. 
A farmer who is classified as the risk averse person 
prefers A to A*. Because both points show equal expected 
incomes but A' has a higher amount of the variability of 









the expected income 
Figure 3. Types of risk by the space of the expected income 
and the variance 
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least amount of the variability of income if the expected 
income can be held constant. 
The risk preferred farmer will select the opposite 
of the risk averse farmer. He selects A' instead of 
A, because he can have the additional utility by having the 
additional risk. 
The risk neutral farmer does not see the difference 
between A and A' because he ignores the variability of 
income. In other words, he would have a preference for the 
highest of the expected income only. 
Let A" be another point and particularly located as 
shown in the figure. Between choices of A and A" the risk 
neutral will select A", as A" has a higher amount of the 
expected income. The risk preference will select A" too as 
A" has a higher amount of both the expected income and the 
variability of income. But the risk averse farmer is very 
reluctant to select A or A". Because A" provides him more 
utility by having more of the expected income, at the same 
time it provides him less utility by adding the additional 
amount of the risk. He is not in a position to decide right 
away whether he prefers A to A", or vice versa. 
Types of risk attitudes may be illustrated with the 
help of the direction of the E[U] curve. The E[U] curve 
shows the combination of the expected income and the 
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variability of the income such that every point on the 
curve yields a farmer an equal amount of the expected utility. 
The risk averse farmer has the E[U] curves that run 
from the southwest of the diagram to the northeast of the 
diagram or vice versa. This shows that he does not like 
the risk because the disutility of the additional risk has 
to be compensated by the utility of the additional 
expected income. 
the variability 
of income or 
risk 
<^path of E[U] for the risk 
averse farmer 
the expected income 
Figure 4. The E[U] direction of the risk averse farmer 
The risk neutral farmer has the E[U] curve that runs 
vertically. It shows that a farmer does not consider the 
amount of risk at all. What he does care about is the 
amount of the expected income only. 
31 
the variability 
of income or 
risk a path the E[U] of the 
risk neutral farmer 
the expected income 
Figure 5. The E[U] direction of the risk neutral farmer 
The risk preferred farmer has the E[U] curve running 
from the northwest to southeast. This shows that the less 
expected income can be compensated by the additional risk, 
the variability 
of income or risk 
a path of the E[U] of the 
risk preferred farmer 
the expected income 
Figure 6. The E[UJ direction of the risk preference farmer 
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or the more expected income is required if he has less 
risk. 
Types of Risk and the 
Utility Function 
The definition of risk averse may be made more meaningful 
and abstract. The risk averse people are defined as those 
people who prefer the expected value of the random variables 
rather than an opportunity of the random variables them­
selves [56] . 
The risk preferred people are opposite of the risk 
averse people, i.e., they prefer the opportunity of the 
random variables rather than the expected value of the 
random variables. 
The risk neutral people do not see the difference be­
tween the opportunities of the random variables and the 
expected value of the random variables. 
By these new definitions and the concept of the 
utility function, types of the risk attidude can be 
illustrated diagrammatically as shown in Figure 7. 
Let and be two random variables with associated 
probabilities of and ^2' respectively.^ 
^In this study, the two random variables are the two 
possible outcomes of the net farm incomes. 
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utility level U(Y) 
U(Y) 
Y wealth or the sure income 
Figure 7. The curve of the utility function with the risk 
premium 
Let Y be the expected value of and i.e., 
Y = Y^PI + Y,?, 
and let utility levels of Y^ and Y^ be U(Y^) and UfYg). 
Their expected utility Û is, 
Û = Pj^U(Y^) + PgUfYg) 
Figure 7 shows the utility curve of the risk averse 
farmer; it can be seen that the utility of the expected 
value of random variable, U(Y) is higher than the expected 
utility derived from the opportunities of random variable, 
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Û. The difference is TT where ir is positive. 
The value of IT is sometimes called "the risk premium", 
it is the maximum value of wealth that a person will give 
up in order to avoid the risky situation. 
For the case of the risk neutral, ir is zero which 
means a person is not willing to pay the risk premium at 
all because the risk does not bother him. And the utility 
curve is the straight line. 
For the case of the risk preference, ir is negative or 
the utility curve is convex from below. This means that 
the person is willing to pay some money so that he can have 
the opportunity of taking risk on himself. 
The sub-classification of the risk attitude is based 
upon how the risk attitude changes as he gets richer. The 
change of their risk attitudes can be seen from "the change 
of the risk premium over wealth." The risk premium over 
wealth means the maximum amount of money that he is willing 
to pay (to the insurance company, etc.) so that he can 
avoid the risk which may be attached to his additional 
dollar wealth. In mathematical language and notation, the 
risk premium over wealth is 3tt/3Y or the first derivative of 
the risk premium with respect to his wealth. If he is 
risk averse with 3w/3Y = 0, this means he is willing to pay 
the constant amount of the risk premium regardless of his 
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increasing wealth, he is called the risk averse with constant 
risk averse. If he is risk averse with 3w/3Y < 0, then he 
is willing to pay less amounts of risk premium as his 
wealth increases, and he is classified as risk averse 
with decreasing averse over wealth. 
Similar classification and reasons go for the case of 
the risk preferred farmer too. If his wealth increases, and 
he is willing to pay more in order to have a chance of 
gambling, he is the risk preference type with increasing risk. 
If he is willing to pay less, he is the risk preference type 
with decreasing risk preference, and if he is willing to 
pay constantly, he is the risk preference type with constant 
risk preference. 
The risk neutral type can not be sub-divided according 
to the increase of wealth because he is not willing to pay 
the risk premium at all. 
Measurement of Risk Attitude 
It was seen in the last section how important the value 
of the risk premium IT for determination of risk attitude is. 
The following will show how the value of TT may be obtained 
from the known utility function which has utility as a func­
tion of wealth or income. 
Assuming the case of the risk averse, by its definition 
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in the section "types of risk and the utility function". 
It may be written mathematically as, 
U(Y) > E[U(Y)] 
then, 
U(Y-7r) = E[U(Y) ] 
where IT is a quantity that makes both sides equal. 
Applying Taylor's expansion around mean Y, and trun­
cated after the second term by assuming the rest are too 
small. 
U(Y) + (Y-Tr-Y)U' (Y) ... = E[U(Y) + (Y-Y)U'{Y) 
+ |(Y-Y)^U"(Y) ...] 
U(Y)-7rU'(Y) = U(Y)(E[Y]-Y)U'(Y) + |e (Y-Y) ^U" (Y) 
= U(Y) + 0 + J ô^YU"(Y), 
where 6^Y = E(Y-Y)^ 
so, 
% . - 1 «Zy 
0'(Y) 
The value of ir is not easily calculated because a 
2 farmer may not know the value of 6 Y. Some farmers may 
2 know the value of ô Y, subjectively, some may know this 
value objectively, but prefer to use the subjective value 
2 2 
of 5 Y. The value of 6 Y is a problem in this study also, 
because this study aims to estimate the value of IT or the 
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risk premium of the selected farmers. 
It has been suggested by Pratt [58], that the risk 
attitude may be measured simply by, 
TT = -U" (Y)/U' (Y) 
Where IT is the number showing the risk attitude^ of 
the selected Iowa farmers in this study. 
There are also other ways to measure the risk attitudes; 
they have been discussed in the chapter Review of Literature. 
It is interesting to note that the utility function is 
based on the ordinal number which has no meaning to be com­
pared among farmers, but both IT'S are the cardinal numbers 
which can be used for comparison among farmers. 
Risk Behaviors 
Most of the studies that use the utility functions 
report that there is a percentage of farmers who are risk 
preference. For examples, the percentage of risk preference 
reported by Dillon and Scandizzo [16] was 21, by Francisco 
and Anderson [22], 5, Halter and Mason [29], as high as 33, 
by Binswanger [9], 19 percent, when the payoff was 0.50 real 
rupees, and 9 percent when the payoff was 5 real rupees, 2 
percent when the pay off was 50 real rupees, and only 1 
^TT should not be confused with the IT that stands for 
the risk premium. This study uses the notation îr for two 
different meanings. 
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percent with 500 hypothetical rupees as the payoff. 
Risk is logically known to create disutility, but why 
some people are risk preference. Some hypothetical 
answers will be attempted. 
(1) When people buy the lottery with a change of 
winning one in a thousand chances, and with the 
payoff only $500 of what they pay for $1. They do 
not pay just for the sake of gambling but they 
pay in order to have "the opportunity of dreaming" 
of what they will do with the money they win. In 
other words, when they have to lose less and may 
get much, they become more risk preference. Under 
such situations, they do not count the expected 
value or the probability as the main concern. 
(2) There are people who believe strongly in luck; 
perhaps they are always lucky. They do not believe 
in the objective probability. For example, if the 
objective probability of winning is 50%, they 
believe that their chances of winning is 70%, in 
other words they see that they are lucky people or 
they assign the subjective probability to be higher 
than the objective probability. 
(3) Most farmers are well-aware of the agricultural 
risk and they are well-prepared for farming under 
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risk. For example, they may diversify their farming, 
use owned equity, use flexibility of enterprises and 
so on [35] . Therefore, their net farm income will 
not be very bad in a very bad year, but it may pro­
vide a good income in a very good year. Therefore, 
they feel it is worth taking a risk and behave as if 
they are risk preference, but in fact they are the 
well-planned risk averse farmers. 
(4) There are people who are addicted to gambling. These 
people are not the objects of this study, or economics 
but the objects of the psychologist or the psychia­
trist. 
(5) Farmers who behave through the estimated utility 
function as risk preference but in fact they are 
not. This is due to the drawback of the utility 
function itself. This will be explained as follows. 
From the section of the utility function, it has been 
derived that, U = U(Y,L). 
The first drawback is that this function is based on 
the no-risk or risk constant situation; risk does not really 
enter the function at all. 
Secondly, the above function assumed the constant of the 
leisure L, U = U(Y,L) or U = U(Y). This assumption does not 
really hold true because when farmers face risk they will 
change the L. It can be observed that farmers may work harder 
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or more working hours in the time of natural unfavorable 
conditions. In graphical framework (Figure 8), the U-curve 
may shift up or down. For example, points A, B and C are 
three points derived from the hypothetical situations of the 
questionnaires. The utility curve is estimated to be the 
risk preference but as a matter of fact those three points 




false U curve 
U(Y, LG ) 
Y or income 
Figure 8. The shifting of the utility curves 
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In conclusion, farmers are always risk averse except 
for the small amount of loss due to high payoff, and except 
for farmers who believe that luck is always on their side. 
This conclusion leads this study to the assumption that all 
selected Iowa farmers are risk averse. 
Reliability of Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes are known to be inconsistent and un­
reliable. As a matter of fact, a man can never be consistent 
in his feelings, and the risk attitude is only a particular 
kind of human feeling. However, the human feeling, in 
general, can not be changed drastically over night. For 
instance, if' a man loves the color pink today, he can not 
hate it the next day, but he may love the pink a little less. 
Similarly, the risk attitude of a man can not be drastically 
changed from one type of risky situation to another. 
This study has constructed the risky situations that 
a farmer may choose. These situations are not exactly what 
farmers are really facing in actual farming (see section 
"Construction of the Utility Index", Chapter IV). Therefore, 
the result of this study may not be exactly what the farmers 
will do in their real farming operations. 
However, economics is not an exact science; there are 
no exact answers. This study, also, does not give the 
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exact results of the study, but it does tell what risk atti­
tudes of farmers are all about. 
Factors Affecting Risk Attitude 
Economic theory suggests only two factors that affect 
the risk attitude, the level of the farm income, and the 
variance of the net farm income. These two suggested factors 
are well-integrated into the utility functions. Besides 
these two, there can be many more factors that affect risk 
attitude, but they go beyond economic theory. In this study, 
consideration will be given to some relevant factors as 
follows : 
(1) Age of farmer; One may hypothesize that the 
younger farmer is less risk averse than the older 
one. Another may argue that the gamblers are not 
necessarily the young. This study will not 
hypothesize on this matter but find out what the 
actual situation is. 
(2) Age of farmer's wife; A farmer is likely to assimi­
late the risk attitude of his wife into his own 
attitude. If the age of a farmer can affect her risk 
attitude, the age of his wife should also affect the 
risk attitude of the wife and then assimilate it 
into the attitude of the farmer. 
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(3) Years of schooling; Years of schooling will likely 
affect the attitudes of farmers, but it is not 
known whether it affects positively or negatively 
upon the risk averse. One may think that more 
schooling years makes a farmer understand the risky 
problems, i.e., he is less risk averse. One may 
argue the other way around too. 
(4) Number of dependents ; Having a greater number of 
dependents should limit the risk bearing ability 
of the farmer, i.e., he is expected to be more risk 
averse. However, the risk bearing ability and the 
risk attitude are not the same thing. He may have 
less risk bearing ability but his risk attitude 
can be much less averse. 
(5) Years of experience in farming; This factor should 
work in the same manner as the case of "the years 
of schooling". One senior fainner may say that he 
has so much experience about risk, he knows how to 
handle it, i.e., he is less risk averse. Another 
farmer who has the same amount of experience says 
that he has undergone too many troubles with risk, 
and he does not wish to go through the same again, 
i.e., this farmer shows he is more risk averse. 
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(6) Total net assets; A larger amount of assets helps 
the fanner to handle a more risky agricultural 
enterprise. But a farmer who is capable of 
handling more risk is not necessarily the one who 
will actually follow through. Furthermore, the 
marginal utility of money is diminishing, i.e., a 
farmer with high net assets may not feel it is 
worth taking the relatively high risk. 
(7) Acres per farm; More acres per farm implies 
higher net farm income, which should work the same 
way as the case of "the net asset he owns". How­
ever, they are not exactly alike; actual acres 
formed can be either owned or rented or both. 
In a bad year, the rented land can be a real lia­
bility to the farmer. 
(8) Net farm income ; The income is the flow concept. 
High income tends to encourage people to spend more, 
and the continuous period of high income will tend 
to establish a certain higher standard of living. 
People may be very conservative about risk taking 
when their income is close to his established 
standard of living. They may be more risk taking 
after he has become accustomed to the higher level 
of income. However, it is uncertain how high net 
farm income may affect the risk attitude of the farmer. 
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CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY 
This study makes use of the primary data collected from 
farmers who live just north of Ames, Iowa. The main 
analytical tool is the Ordinary Least Squares Method. 
Selection of Samples 
The area situated to the north of Ames, Iowa was 
selected because it was close to where the researcher him­
self lived. There was no other prime reason for choosing 
this particular area over other areas near Ames. The area 
selected was the northern part of the Franklin Township and 
almost the entire area of Lafayette Township. Both town­
ships are in Story County, Iowa, as shown in Figure 9. 
Names of people were drawn randomly from the Story 
County, Iowa Rural Resident Directory, 1980 [17]. This was 
the most up to date directory available; it contains names 
of all rural people in the area regardless of whether 
they are farmers or not. The telephone was used to contact 
area residents, and to find out whether or not the people 
contacted qualified for the sample. 
The people who qualified for the sample had to be farmers 
who earned at least half of their income from farming. They 
had to adhere to standard practices of agricultural enter­
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/ indicating the selected area of the 
study. 
Figure 9. The sampled area 
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contacted practiced farming by keeping and selling horses, 
therefore, he was not included in the sample because other 
farmers in the sampled area do not sell horses as part of the 
farming business.• The common enterprises were field crops, 
pigs, and cattle. 
Questionnaires 
Survey schedules were used instead of the formal ques­
tionnaires. The survey schedule was a set of the informal 
questions with stated objectives. A formal questionnaire 
was not used because the number of people in the sample 
was relatively small and the researcher himself acted as 
field investigator. 
There were two parts to the survey schedule. The first 
part dealt with the socio-economic background of the farmer. 
The summing-up results to the questions is located in the 
section "Socio-economic Background of the Selected Farmers", 
Chapter V. The second part dealt with decisions of farmers 
listed under hypothetical risky situations. The substance 
of this question given in the section "Construction of the 
Utility Index", Chapter IV. 
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Data Collection 
The data were collected during the months of March and 
April, 1981, which was the off-growing season. This time 
of the year was selected so that farmers would have adequate 
time for being interviewed. Unfortunately, it was learned 
that most of the selected farmers were not at home during 
most of the day. The selected months were good for the 
farmers, but it was difficult to find them at their homes. 
There were, altogether, 42 farmers whose data were 
collected successfully. Out of these, 6 indicated initially 
that they were risk preference (which was inconsistent with 
the assumption of this study).. Attempts were made to find 
out why this was true. It was found that they misunderstood 
the questions, such as; 
(1) They could plan their farming such that the outcome 
would not be as bad as the given hypothetical situation, and 
they could work harder if the outcome was bad. 
(2) They used their own subjective probability on top 
of the objective probability given by the hypothetical risky 
situations given in the questionnaire. 
They were.made to understand that they could not use 
any technique or other probability besides the given one. 
It was explained to them why the risk was not good and why 
less risk was good. It was explained carefully because the 
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field investigator wanted to avoid using any influence or 
show any personal bias to the farmers. 
Lastly, five out of six changed their minds and indi­
cated the preference of the sure thing over the risky one. 
Only one farmer stood firm as being a risk preference 
farmer. He was questioned further to see if he enjoyed 
taking a. gamble; the answer was negative. His attitude 
was hard to understand because he was a risk preference 
farmer but did not like the gamble. He could be used as 
a special case to show that the risk attitude of people 
may drastically change from one type of risky business to 
another. However, this study was not framed to make a deep 
investigation into any one particular farmer ; therefore, 
he was dropped from the analysis. So, 41 farmers re­
mained for the analytical part of this study and all of them 
were risk averse. 
Mathematical Form of the Utility 
Function 
There are many mathematical forms that may fit the data 
of the hypothetical table in Chapter III of "Construction of 
the Utility Function", but, it is necessary to select the 
mathematical form that not only fits the data but also is 
consistent with the assumption about the risk attitude of 
the farmers also. 
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Following are the assumptions required for the utility 
function in this study. 
(1) Utility is derived from wealth only. This implies 
that if there is wealth, there must be utility, 
and there is no utility without wealth. This also 
implies that the utility curve should pass through 
the origin of the diagram.^ 
(2) Wealth or money is not directly consumed by the 
farmers, it is used as a medium of exchange or the 
store of value; therefore, farmers can not be 
satiated. Farmers always find utility in having 
more wealth no matter how much they have. This 
implies that the utility curve never bends down toward 
the OX axis, regardless of how long the OX-asis 
may go. 
(3) Money is used as a medium of exchange for goods, 
therefore, it has certain characteristics like any 
other goods. Thus, the marginal utility of money 
to the farmers is diminishing. This implies that 
the second derivative of the utility function with 
respect to wealth is negative or U"(Y) 0. 
(4) Farmers are assumed by this study to be the risk 
averse type. In other words, they always prefer 
the utility of the expected value of the random 
^This requirement is not very strict because the utility 





Figure 10. The right utility curve required by this study 
variables rather than the utility of the random 
variables themselves. This means that it requires 
the risk premium TT to be positive. 
To meet this requirement, the utility curve 
must be concave from below or the first derivative 
of the utility function with respect to wealth 
must be positive. Stated mathematically, it 
requires U'(Y) >0. 
(5) Recall the section Types of Risk Attitudes and the 
Utility function, Chapter III; the person who is 
risk averse and with increasing risk over wealth 
has the risk premium TT per dollar of wealth decreases 
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as the wealth Y increases. Using mathematical 
language, it says that the first derivative of the 
risk premium with respect to wealth is negative or 
3Tr/3Y 0. 
With all of the requirements and assumptions about the 
utility function in this study, two mathematical forms have 
been selected, e.g., 
(1) U(Y) = Y^ 
(2) U(Y) = a log Y. 
The proof that these two selected forms of questions 
can fulfill all requirements and assumptions will be given 
as follows: 
Form 1 ; U (Y) = Y^ where 0 < a < 1 
where a is the estimated coefficient. 
Differentiating, with respect to Y 




where a(a-1) < 0, so 
(1.2) 
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From the section Measurement of Risk Attitude, 
^ = 1 52^ OIL 
U'(Y) 
does some substitutions from (1.1) and (1.2). Therefore, 
= - \ note (a-1) < 0, i.e., n > 0 (1.3) 
Differentiating IT with respect to Y, 
gY = - § 6^Y(a-l)(-I)Y"^, note -|(a-l)(-1) < 0, so 
IY < 0 (1.4) 
From the findings of (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4), 
it is confirmed that the form U(Y) = Y^ is satisfactory. 
Form 2 ; U(Y) = a log Y where a > 0 
Differentiating U with respect to Y, 
so. 
3? > 0 (2.1) 
The second order differentiation will be,. 
2 




^ < 0 (2.2) 
dY 
From the section Measurement of Risk Attitude, 
n = _ 1 gZy 
^ U'(Y) 
Substituting (2.1) and (2.2) into the above expression, 
i.e., 
w . - i «Zy 
2 ay-i 
= I â^Y Y~^ 
TT > 0 (2.3) 
Differentiating ir with respect to Y, i.e., 
^ = I 6^Y(-1)Y"^ 
^ < 0 (2.4) 
The finding in (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) suggests 
that the form of U(Y) = a log Y is acceptable to be used 
as the form of the utility function in this study. 
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Estimation by the Ordinary Least Square 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the SAS programming 
package are used as the main statistical tool in this study. 
They are used for the estimation of the utility functions 
of each selected Iowa farmer. They are also used to in­
vestigate the effect of various factors upon the risk atti­
tudes of the farmers. 
The technique of the OLS is given in various texts of 
statistics and econometrics. This technique is very popularly 
used, regardless of it's restricted assumptions. This section 
will review only a few important assumptions in relation to 
the problem of this study [63]. 
Let the model be Y = + ^2^2 ^ where the Y and X2 
are a dependent variable and an independent variable, Ê^, bg 
are estimated parameters and is the random variable. The 
OLS estimators are said to be the Best Linear Unbiased Esti­
mators (BLUE) if it can fulfill the following assumptions. 
(1) EfU^] = 0 
(2) V(U^) = 6 for all i 
(3) COV(U^, Uj) = 0 where i^j 
(4) is fixed, i.e., it has no distribution. 
There is no assurance in this study that all the above 
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assumptions are satisfied. This implies that there is a 
chance that BLUE may not hold in this study. 
In order to perform a statistical test of the estimated 
parameter bj, the additional assumption requires to be 
independently normally distributed. This assumption is not 
assured in this study. 
Another problem associated with the statistical 
technique of OLS is "the left out variable". This study 
defines that the utility depends upon only income, i.e., it 
is not complete. As a matter of fact, the utility may depend 
upon many other variables, e.g., leisure, types of agri­
cultural enterprise, or the weather. 
Some variables affecting risk attitudes may have been 
omitted in this study. This study specified only the 
relevant factors. As a result of the omitted variables, the 
statistical estimated parameters by OLS will be biased and 
the variance of the estimated parameters will not be effi­
cient (minimum). These will lead to further testing of the 
statistical inference problem. 
There are other problems in the study of the factors 
affecting risk attitude; it is the well-known multicollinearity. 
This is the situation when the independent variables are 
correlated, this will cause the variance of bj to be unduly 
large, i.e., it may lead to the false conclusion that the 
independent variables do not affect the dependent variable. 
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Also, the estimated Ê^'s are no longer valid, because the 
effects of independent variables can not be separated. 
This section stresses that there are drawbacks be­
cause OLS was used in this study. Therefore, one must be 
cautioned to interpret or use the results of this study. 
Measurement of Dispersion: Skewness 
and Kurtosis 
The concepts of skewness and kurtosis are very useful 
to study the shape of the probability distribution of any 
set of variables [63]. 
Skewness is defined as the third moment around the 
mean, divided by the third power of the standard deviation, 
i.e., 
SK = {Z(X^-X)^/n}/6^ 
where is the value of the value of the variate i, X is 
a mean, n is number of variates, and 6 is the standard 
deviation. 
The value of SK is zero if the distribution is normally 
distributed because the positive values and negative values 
of (X^-X)^ are balanced, due to the symmetry of the 
distribution. If the distribution has a large, long tail 
to the right with the hump to the left, the value of SK is 
positive; the value of SK is negative if the large, long 
tail is to the left and the hump to the right. The shapes of 
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the probability distribution with the positive and negative 
skewness are given in Figures 11 and 12. 
Kurtosis is defined as the 4th moment around the mean, 
divided by the fourth power of the standard deviation, i.e., 
Ks = {EX^-X)^/n}/0^ 
The value of Ks is always positive because of the 
fourth power of both the moment and the standard deviation. 
The value of Ks is 3 if the distribution is normally 
distributed. It will be Ks > 3 if the hump of the distribu­
tion is higher than that of the normal distribution. The 
flatter shape of distribution has the value of Ks < 3. The 
shapes of the distribution with K >3, K = 3, and K <3 are 
given in Figure 13 for comparison. 
Chi-square Test for Normal 
Distribution 
This study will need to test the distribution of 
certain risk attitude coefficients. The test is important 
because it will tell whether that distribution of risk 
attitude coefficients are normally distributed or not. 
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Probability 
SK > 0 
Variate mean 
Figure 11. Distribution curve with positive skewness 
Probability 
SK < 0 
Variate mean 





Figure 13. Distribution curves with different values of 
kurtosis coefficients 
The chi-square test has a very broad application [63] 
but this section will only mention what is necessary for 
this research. 
The risk attitude coefficients are arranged from the 
smallest to the largest value, then they are divided into 
P parts, each part shall contain at least 5 variates (chi-
square test may not be recommended if there is a part 
which has less than 5 variates). 
Then, the mean and variance of the population are esti­
mated from the given risk attitude coefficients. If the 
mean and variance are known, and with the help of the 
normal distribution table, the expected frequencies of each 
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part can be calculated. 
The degrees of freedom in this case will be (P-3) 
because both mean and variance of the population are 
estimated. 
More discussion pertaining to actual values of the risk 
attitudes are given in Chapter V when this test is actually 
performed. 
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this study will be reported in the five 
following sections: (1) socio-economic background of 
selected farmers, (2) estimated utility functions, (3) 
estimated risk attitudes, (4) distribution of risk atti­
tude, and last, (5) factors affecting the risk attitudes. 
Socio-economic Background of 
Selected Farmers 
This study aims to investigate neither detailed socio­
economic conditions, nor the complicated farming business 
of the selected farmers. It merely aims to have minimal 
information about the farmers which will be sufficient to in­
vestigate the affect of these relevant backgrounds upon the 
risk attitudes. This information is given in summarized 
form in Table 2. 
The average age of the farmers is 49.14 years, which is 
about 2 years older than the average wife; total years of 
schooling is about 1 year beyond high school graduation; and 
number of dependents, which includes the farmer and his wife, 
is 3.85. This number includes all persons whom the 
farmer supports either partially or totally. 
The farmer's average years of experience in farming is 
28.76 years, considering the average age is about 49 years, 
this implies that he began farming at approximately 21 years 
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Table 2. Socio-economic background of the selected farmers 
Number Socio-economic characteristics Mean Standard deviation 
1 Age of farmer (years) 49 .14 16 .26 
2 Age of farmer's wife (years) 47 .21 15 .89 
3 Total years of schooling 13 .12 4 .29 
4 Number of dependents 3 .85 1 .23 
5 Years experience in farming 28 .76 11 .48 
6 Total net assets (dollars) 356 ,489 .48 29,706 .83 
7 Acres per farm 347 .67 118 .34 
8 Net farm income of last 
year (dollars) 21,237.43 6,769.19 
of age. 
The farmer's total net assets averages $346,489.48, 
which includes both physical and nonphysical assets. This 
takes into consideration the amount of loans that he may 
have lent out or borrowed himself. All items, whether 
related to the farming business or personal possessions 
are taken into account. The value of physical assets are 
evaluated by the farmers themselves. It may be noted that 
this study does not break down this heading because this 
will be used as a factor that affects the risk attitude, 
when a farmer thinks of the risky situation or how much 
of a risk he will take, he does not break his total assets 
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into various categories but rather, he takes into considera­
tion his total assets. 
Total acres per farm is averaged at 347.67 acres. This 
is the land that a farmer cultivates, whether he owns or he 
rents. 
The net farm income of the last year is averaged at 
$21,237.43. This amount excludes the amount of rent that 
a farmer may pay to a landlord (the concept of the net 
farm income is often used to include rent to a landlord). 
Estimated Utility Functions 
The estimation of the utility functions for each of the 
41 selected farmers is done by the statistical ordinary 
least squares technique. Two functional forms of equations 
are used, i.e., 
U = or log Y = a log Y 
U = a log Y 
U stands for the utility index and Y for the sure income 
or the certainty equivalent certified by the farmers, and 
"a" stands for the parameter to be estimated. 
The results of the estimation are given in Table 
3. The first column of the table gives the farmer number 
for purposes of identification with which form of equation. 
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients of the utility functions 
of 41 selected Iowa farmers 
Farmer number 
- form number 
Estimate parameters, a's 




























































Table 3 (Continued) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 






























































Table 3 (Continued) 














































The second column shows the values of the estimated parameter 
"a" with the standard error of this estimator in the paren-
2 theses. The last column gives the value of R or coefficient 
of variation. 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the equation form 
2 (1) or the double log form gives very high R -value. The 
2 lowest R -value is still higher than 0.95. The values of 
the standard error (figures in parentheses) are also very low, 
all of the estimated parameters are significant above the 95% 
level of significance. The result of this form is highly 
satisfactory. 
The semi-log form or form (2) is not a bad one, the 
2 lowest value of R is above .71, the values of the standard 
errors are also low enough. 
However, comparing form (1) and form (2) in every 
farmer number, one can find that form (1) is by far more 
2 
superior to form (2) in both value of R and value of 
the standard error of the estimated parameter. This leads 
to the conclusion that form (1) alone stands for the 
further analysis; because form (2) is not good enough to 
be an alternative for form (1) even if form (1) fails to do 
the analysis. 
It should be noted that form (1) provides the calcu­
lated values of the elasticity of utility with respect 
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to income directly.^ This elasticity value is equal to 
the value of the estimated parameter. For example, if 
the farmer number 1 has his net farm income increased by 
1%, he will get additional utility by 0.398143 percent 
(see farmer number 1, form number 1 in Table 3). This 
form, (1), is also said to provide constant elasticity. 
Because the value of elasticity is always constant, regard­
less of the level of net farm income he may receive. 
Recall the implicit assumption of this study that all 
farmers are risk averse. The estimated utility function of 
form (1) (and also form (2)) is consistent with the assump­
tion, as all estimated parameters of form (1) has value 
less than one. If it is one, it will be the case of the 
risk neutral, if it is more than one, it will indicate 
the risk-lover. 
While estimating the utility function of form (1), 
it does not impose the estimation technique to have the 
estimate parameter to be less than one. If the estimated 
parameter is less than one, this implies two satisfactory 
consequences, first, the result of the estimation by the 
form (1) is consistent with the assumption, and/or secondly, 
the assumption about expected risk averse attitudes of 
selected Iowa farmers are correct, as proven by the 
^If U = Y^, then elasticity of U, with respect to Y, is 
d log U _ _ 
d log Y 
73 
results of the estimation by form (1). 
Estimated Risk Attitude 
Coefficients 
As discussed earlier, there are many kinds of risk 
attitude coefficients. In this section, four kinds of 
risk attitude coefficients will be estimated from the 
double log form of the utility functions. 
Recall the definition of the coefficients from Chapters 
II and III, that, 
(1) The absolute risk averse, ARA by Pratt [58] is 
- U"(Y)/U'(Y) 
(2) The relative risk averse, RRA by Pratt is 
-[U" (Y)/U' (Y)]Y or RRA = ARA • Y 
(3) The risk premium, TTP is Ô^YU" (Y)/U ' (Y) , or 
TTP = I 6^Y[-U" (Y)/U'(Y) ] 
= J 6^Y . ARA 
(4) The risk premium per one dollar of sure income, 
or, TrP/$ = ïïP/Y. 
For the form of the double log utility function, the 
above four definitions lead to the working formula for 
the practical calculation as follows : 
(1) RRA = (1-a) 
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(2) ARA = (l-a)/Y 
(3) TTP = |(l-a)6^Y/Y 
(4) TrP/$ = j(l-a)Ô^Y/(Y)^ 
The values of these four kinds of coefficients are 
calculated by the above formula and given in Table 4. The 
_ 2 
value of Y and 6 Y are obtained from the hypothetical risky 
situation of 50%-50% chances of getting 3/2 times and 1/2 
time of the last year net farm income. For example, the 
calculation for the farmer number 1 is from the situation 
that he may get $18,000 with the probability of 0.5 and 
$6,000, with the probability of 0.5, as his last year net 
farm income was $12,000. 
The hypothetical net farm income in Table 4 is not 
exactly the last year net farm income reported by farmers. 
The hypothetical one may be equal to, or slightly higher, 
than that reported. For example, if a farmer is reported to 
have $11,500, the hypothetical one will be $12,000. This 
will help the farmer to certify the certainty equivalent 
value more simply by thinking of the high outcome as $18,000 
and the low outcome as $6,000 instead of $17,250 and $5,750. 
The values of RRA in the table have been scaled up by 
3 7 10 for being convenient, and by 10 for the case of ARA. 
The last column is the risk premium in cents per one 
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3 7 
Table 4. Values of RRA with 10 scaling up, the ARA with 10 
scaling up, the risk premium dollars, and the cents 













per one dollar 
of certainty 
1 12,000 601.86 501.54 902.78 7.53 
2 17,000 654.03 331.78 1,198.56 7.05 
3 15,000 618.02 412.01 1,158.78 7.72 
4 21,000 582.40 277.33 1,528.81 7.28 
5 29,000 625.32 215.63 2,266.79 7.81 
6 35,000 574.96 164.28 2,515.56 7.18 
7 12,000 605.11 504.25 907.66 7.56 
8 21,000 599.19 285.32 1,572.86 7.49 
9 37,000 615.72 166.41 2,771.24 7.49 
10 25,000 615.18 246.07 1,922.44 7.69 
11 21,000 645.84 307.54 1,695.33 8.07 
12 19,000 570.07 300.04 1,353.92 7.12 
13 27,000 592.58 219.47 1,999.95 7.40 
14 16,000 574.00 358.75 1,148.01 7.17 
15 19,000 420.58 211.36 998.86 5.25 
16 31,000 557.38 179.79 2,159.83 6.97 
17 17,000 574.01 337.65 1,219.77 7.17 
18 19,000 576.42 303.38 1,368.99 7.21 
19 22,000 594.62 270.28 1,635.20 7.43 
20 18,000 537.63 298.68 1,209.69 6.72 
21 18,000 562.18 312.32 1,264.90 7.02 
22 40,000 606.57 151.64 3,032.89 7.58 
23 21,000 572.39 272.57 1,502.52 7.15 
24 12,000 532.15 443.46 798.23 6.65 
25 24,000 619.77 258.24 1,859.32 7.74 
26 25,000 514.18 245.67 1,919.33 7.67 
27 17,000 603.40 354.94 1,282.23 7.54 
28 25,000 578.57 231.42 1,808.04 7.23 
29 26,000 626.19 240.84 2,035.14 7.82 
30 16,000 648.72 405.45 1,297.45 8.11 
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Risk per one 
premium pf^certainty 
31 14,000 617.41 440.81 1,079.99 7.74 
32 22,000 662.81 199.69 1,822.47 8.28 
33 26,000 621.69 239.12 2,020.52 7.77 
34 20,000 633.45 316.72 1,583.63 7.91 
35 18,000 608.74 338.13 1,369.66 7.61 
36 24,000 456.38 190.16 1,369.14 5.70 
37 27,000 589.20 218.22 1,988.55 7.36 
38 21,000 660.47 314.51 1,733.74 8.25 
39 16,000 728.56 455.35 1,457.12 9.10 
40 32,000 587.44 183.57 2,349.79 7.34 
41 14,000 612.76 437.68 1,072.32 7.66 
Min. value 420.58 151.64 798.23 5.25 
Max. value 728.56 504.25 3,032.89 9.10 
Mean 595.59 296.21 1,614.13 7.42 
Standard deviation 51.29 94.79 514.38 .64 
Coefficient of 
variation 8.61% 32.00% 31.87% 8.29% 
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dollar of the net farm income. It is calculated by having 
$ risk premium divided by the hypothetical net farm income. 
The Absolute Risk Averse 
The absolute risk averse, ARA is absolute in the sense 
that it is free from monotonie transformation of the utility 
function because U"(Y) has been divided by U'(Y). Pratt 
[58] has put the minus sign in the front of U"(Y)/U'(Y) 
because the risk averse people always have U"(Y) < 0, i.e., 
-U"(Y)/U'(Y) always gives the positive value for risk 
averse persons. 
With the double log form of the utility function, 
ARA = (l-a)/Y so the ARA decreases as the expected net farm 
income increases. In other words, a farmer becomes less 
risk averse for the additional expected net farm income, 
evaluation of the last years net farm income in Table 4 
shows that the farmer who is the most risk averse has 
ARA = 504.25 which is more than 3 times that of ARA of the 
least risk averse farmer. The mean of ARA for the 41 
selected Iowa farmers is 296.21 with the standard deviation 
of. 94.79. The coefficient of variation is 32.00%. 
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The Relative Risk Averse 
The relative risk averse, RRA. is relative in the sense 
that it has integrated the magnitude of the net farm income 
into the measurement. The RRA is simply the product of ARA 
and the net farm income. The purpose of multiplying the ARA 
by the net farm income is to represent the effect of the 
net farm income upon the risk behavior of a farmer. For 
example, consider two farmers, one has low expected net 
farm income and is less risk averse, and one has high net 
farm income and is more risk averse. These two may behave 
very much alike during a risky situation because the farmer 
who is less risk averse is limited by the low net farm in­
come, and the one with a high net farm income is restricted 
by the more risk averse. This is the reason why both ARA 
and the net farm income should be mutually expressed in the 
risk attitude of the people or farmers. 
The lowest RRA in the table is 420.58, which is about 
60% of the highest RRA of 728.56. (It is more than three 
times the case of the ARA.) The coefficient of variation is 
very low at 8.61%, this should explain why farmers-do not 
behave much different from each other, even their ARA varies 
greatly. The mean of RRA is 595.59 with relatively small 
standard deviation at 51.29. 
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The Risk Premium 
The risk premium indicates the maximum amount that a 
farmer will pay in order to have sure dollars for the 
hypothetical net farm income instead of having a 50% chance 
of getting 1.5 times more and a 50% chance of getting 0.5 
times this income. For example, farmer number 1, in Table 
4, is willing to pay at the maximum, $902.78, in order to have 
a guaranteed $12,000 net farm income, instead of having 
$18,000 with 0.5 probability of $6,000, with also 0.5 
probability. 
The risk premium is, in some sense, superior to the 
ARA and RRA, because the risk premium gives meaningful 
information, directly. It tells exactly how much a farmer 
will pay in exchange for protection of his net farm in­
come. 
From Table 4 we see that the value of the risk premium 
varies from the minimum of $798.23 to $3,032.89, with the 
mean of $1,614.13 and a standard deviation of $514.38; the 
coefficient of variation is about 30% of the mean. 
The value of the risk premium is affected by the value of 
2 — 
variance 6 Y as well as the net farm income, Y. If the re-
2 lationship between the risk premium and 6 Y is put into a 
graph, the straight line curve will be obtained. The curve 
between the risk premium and the net farm income will be 
hyperbola. 
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risk premium, TTP 
expected net 
farm income or Y 
Figure 14. Relationship between the risk premium and the 
net expected income 
risk premium, TTP 
variance or & Y 
Figure 15. Relationship between the risk premium and the 
variance 
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Relationship between the Risk Premium, Variance 
Expected Income and the Probability 
The risk premium, variance, and the net farm income are 
all affected simultaneously by the probability associated 
with the outcome. The interesting question is, if the 
probability changes, what changes can be expected on these 
three quantities? 
Using a hypothetical situation, assume that a farmer 
changes the probability of the high and low net farm in­
come from 90% and 10%, 80% and 20%, ... to 10% and 90%. 
Then, the values of the risk premium, the expected net 
farm income and the variance are calculated (see Appendix 
B for the detailed calculations). The numerical results 
of the calculation are given in Table 5. 
The unit Y and "a" in Table 5 stand for last years 
net farm income (or any constant number) and the estimated 
parameters of the utility function. The hypothetical 
high and low net farm incomes are 1.5Y and 0.5Y, respectively; 
actual values of the variance and the risk premium are scaled 
up by 100 for convenience. 
The numbers in Table 6 are graphic. In the following 
graph, the unit of the expected net farm income is Y, the 
2 
unit of the variance is Y and the unit of the risk premium 
is Y((1/2)(1-a)]. 
Note that in order to see the relationship of these 
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Table 5. Numerical results of the expected net farm income, variance, and the risk 
premium by varying the probabilities of the high and low net farm incomes 
Probability of the 





(unit = Y) 
Variance of the 
expected net 
farm income, 
scaling up by_ 




(unit = Y(i) (1-a)) 
0.90 and 0.10 1.4 9.0 12.60 
0.80 and 0.20 1.3 16.0 20.80 
0.70 and 0.30 1.2 21.0 25.20 
0.60 and 0.40 1.1 24.2 26.62 
0.50 and 0.50 1.0 25.0 25.00 
0.40 and 0.60 0.9 24.2 21.78 
0.30 and 0.70 0.8 21.0 16.90 
0.20 and 0.80 0.7 16.0 11.20 
0.10 and 0.90 0.6 9.0 5.40 
(3) 
iA\ Risk premium: unit=-l- (l-a)Y 





expected net farm income 
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Figure 16. Effect of probability changes upon risk premium, variance, 
and expected net farm income 
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three quantities in the graph the value of Y and of "a" are 
not needed. This means that the graphical relationship of 
these three quantities always hold for all farmers who have 
the double log utility function regardless of the different 
values of Y's and a's of different farmers. 
In this graph, points (1) represent the situation 
of 90% and 10% probabilities of the high and low net farm 
income . . . points (9) represent the situation of 10% and 
90% probabilities of the high and low net farm income. 
The curves show that the risk premium is highest at 
points (4), and the variance is highest at point (5) the 
number in the last 4 rows of Appendix B can prove these 
highest points). 
This leads to the remarkable and theoretical conclusion 
that if the utility function takes the double log form, 
and if the probabilities of the two outcomes change, then: 
(1) The highest risk premium, the highest variance, 
and the highest expected net farm income are not 
derived from the same situation of the probabilities; 
(2) The highest risk premium is where the probabilities 
of the high and low outcomes are 60% and 40%; 
(3) The highest variance is where the probabilities of the 
high and low outcomes are 50% and 50%; 
(4) The highest risk premium is attained before the 
variance can reach the peak of the highest value; 
85 
(5) Both the risk premium and the variance increase 
while the expected income increases, but there are 
points where the variance and the risk premium turn 
backward while the expected income increases. 
Marginal and Average Risk Premium with 
Respect to the income 
The average risk premium or the risk premium per one 
dollar of certainty is given in the last column of Table 4. 
The average risk premium given in this table is calculated 
on the certain condition of 50%-50% chances of having high 
and low net farm incomes. If these probabilities changed, 
the average risk premium will not be the same. 
These average values appear to be centered around the 
mean of 7.42 cents per one dollar of the net farm income. 
They have a very low standard deviation at 0.64 cents and 
also very low coefficient of variation at 8.29%; maximum 
value is very large at 9.10 cents and minimum value is 
very low at 5.25 cents compared to the size of the standard 
deviation. 
It is interesting to learn that most farmers are willing 
to pay the average risk premium at about 7.42 cents, re­
gardless of their expected net farm income level or their 
socio-economic difference. 
The marginal risk premium is the maximum amount that 
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a farmer will pay in order to avoid the uncertainty of one 
additional dollar of his net farm income. 
For the double log form of the utility function, the 
marginal risk premium is the same quantity with the average 
risk premium. 
Distribution of Risk Attitude 
Coefficients 
The simple graphical method showing the frequency 
distribution is the histogram, a simple concept of statistics 
dealing with skewness and kurtosis to show the shape of the 
probability distribution curves. 
In order to construct the histogram in this section, 
risk attitude coefficients of each category are arranged 
from the smallest value to the largest value. The distance 
between the smallest value to the largest values is then 
Table 6. Skewness and kurtosis coefficients of the risk 
attitude distributions 
Risk attitude Skewness Kurtosis 
coefficient coefficients coefficients 
RRA -1.0546 4.1688 
ARA 0.5798 -0.4324 
Risk premium 0.7613 0.3611 
Average risk premium -1.0062 3.8500 
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divided into ten equal sections. The frequencies that fall 
into each section are counted and converted into percentage 
or probability. 
The histogram of RRA, ARA, risk premium and the average 
risk premium are given in Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18, respec­
tively. Coefficients of skewness and kurtosis of these four 
risk attitude coefficient distributions are given in Table 
6 .  
Among the four categories of risk attitude coefficients, 
the average risk premium distribution has height closest to 
the height of the normal distribution, because it has the 
best kurtosis coefficient at 3.8500 where the one for 
normal distribution is 3. The ARA distribution is so flat 
that the kurtosis coefficient becomes negative at -0.4324. 
Regarding the symmetry of the distribution, the RRA 
and the average risk premium distributions are shown to 
skew to the left, ARA and risk premium distribution are 
shown to skew to the right. 
The Normality of the Relative Risk 
Averse Distribution 
By the histograms in Figures 15-18, and by the 
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis, the RRA distribution 
is one of the most suspected to be normally distributed or it 
may not be significantly different from the normal 
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Figure 17. Percentage distribution of RRA coefficients 
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Figure 18. Percentage distribution of ARA coefficients 
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Figure 20. Percentage distribution of the risk premium per 
one sure dollar of the net farm income 
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distribution. This test can be performed by the simple 
X^-test. 
The normal test of RRA will be performed as follows: 
549.82-.66 549.82+.66 
( , , 
994.82 
Figure 21. Division of RRA distribution (6 = variance) 
The distribution is divided into 4 parts with the help 
of mean and variance as shown in the figure. And, with the 
help of the normal distribution table [63], the expected 
frequency of each part is obtained. The observed frequencies 
Observed frequency 7 11 16 7 
Expected frequency 9.11 11.39 11.39 9.11 
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are obtained by counting the set of RRA variables. The 
formula for this test is 
X2 = E 1°^ 
1 B 
where 
0 = an observed frequency 
E = an expected frequency 
The degrees of freedom in this case is only one be­
cause the mean and variance of population are 
estimated. 
2 The value of the calculated X turns out to be 2.8566 
which is too large compared to the tabulated value. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that this distribution 
is like the normal distribution. 
Factors Affecting Risk 
Attitudes 
Various kinds of risk attitude coefficients have been 
estimated from the double log form of the utility function. 
As a matter of fact, all those coefficients depend upon 
only one value, "a", or the estimated parameter of the 
utility function. 
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The value "a" itself is assumed to be estimated constant 
for a farmer, but it varies from one farmer to the next. 
What makes "a" varied is the socio-economic background of 
the farmers. In other words, "a" is a function of all socio­
economic variables, or, 
a = (j) (socio-economic variables) 
or, 
a = bg + b^ (socio-economic variables). 
There are eight socio-economic characteristics listed 
in Chapter III which are considered to be important factors 
affecting the risk attitude. These eight variables are not 
really independent from each other, but the OLS which will 
be used for estimation requires them to be independent. Some 
of them may be dropped out. 
(1) Age of farmer is not independent from the age of 
hiw wife. A farmer tends to marry a woman who is a few 
years younger than he, this is the social norm of this 
society. Therefore, the age of his wife variable should be 
dropped as the age of the farmer himself is more important. 
The simple correlation of these variables is as high as 0.9124. 
(2) The age of a farmer and years of experience in 
farming are not theoretically independent. They start farming 
at the age of around 20 years old and continue doing so. The 
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older they are, the more experience they have. One should 
be dropped out, i.e., years of experience, which is seen 
to be the least affecting factor upon the risk attitude. 
The simple correlation of these is 0.8261. 
(3) The acres per farm is correlated with the net farm 
income. Iowa farmers earn most of their farm income from 
the crop growing, i.e., more acres result in more net farm 
income. Acres per farm is dropped out. The simple correla­
tion coefficient is 0.7612. 
(4) The simple correlation coefficient between the 
total net asset he owns and the net farm income is also high 
as .7136. Most assets of the farmer are in the form of the 
investment in his farm, i.e., more net assets result in 
more net farm income. 
(5) The age of a farmer and the net farm income is 
also correlated very highly and the simple correlation is 
0.7215. As a farmer gets older, he has accumulated more 
wealth which is mainly invested in his farm resulting in 
the high net farm income. Both the age of the farmer and the 
net farm income are very important factors affecting risk 
attitude, unfortunately, they cannot be quantified in the 
same equation by the simple approach of OLS, 
Now, there are only three variables which are really 
independent, they are the net farm income, the years of 
schooling and the number of dependent variables. These will 
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be used for estimation. 
Let Y be the net farm income 
YSC be years of schooling 
ND be number of dependents, and 
"a" be the estimated parameter by the double log form 
of the utility function. 
The result of the OLS estimation is, 
a = 0.4554 - 0.1124 (YSC) + 0.01486 (ND) - 0.1610 Y 
(0.07520) (0.005716) (0.010277) (0.001646) 
= 0.46075 
The figures in the parentheses are the standard errors 
of the estimated parameters. 
The estimation shows the significant affect of the year 
of schooling, YSC very high significant affect of the net 
farm income, Y and relatively lower significant effect of 
2 the number of dependents. The value of R seems to be high 
enough for the cross section data. 
The higher years of schooling will decrease the value 
of "a" or will be more risk averse. In other words, the 
higher education makes farmers more risk averse. 
The higher income will reduce the value of "a" or will 
be more risk averse. The rich farmers are more risk averse 
than the poor. Recall that an individual farmer becomes less 
risk averse as he gets richer (ARA = (l-a)/Y). These two seem 
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needed. 
As farmers have a certain standard of living that they 
like to maintain without risk. As an individual farmer 
gets richer and gets above his desired level, he will be 
less risk averse because he has ensured himself the required 
income. 
But in case of the cross section data all farmers are 
pooled together, every farmer has his own desired standard 
level of living. None in the group feel that they have the 
income above the desired level. Therefore, the explanation 
of how an individual feels when he gets richer cannot be 
applied to the case of the group of all farmers. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY 
Risk attitudes of farmers are very important to the 
decision making under risk of farmers. There are many 
methods to study the risk attitude. This study used the 
method called the direct application of the utility function. 
This method involves the construction of the utility functions 
for selected farmers. Then, the risk attitude measurement 
coefficients are derived from the constructed utility func­
tions. These measurement coefficients used are the absolute 
risk averse coefficient, the relative risk averse coefficient, 
and the risk premium. 
This study includes data collection from 41 randomly 
selected farmers whose farms are located on the north of 
Iowa State University campus, Ames, Iowa. Two forms of 
the utility functions are used, they are the double log 
form and the semi-double log form. This utility function 
says that the utility is a function of only income. The 
estimation technique of the utility function is the ordinary 
least squares method. The result of the study of this esti­
mation shows that the double log form is the only one ac­
cepted to be used in this study. This study has the 
hypothesis that selected farmers are all risk averse, and this 
hypothesis is confirmed by the result of this study. 
The probability distribution of the estimated risk 
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attitude coefficients are proved to be significantly dif­
ferent from the normal distribution. The proof done by the 
chi-square method. Attempt has been made to consider 
what factors may affect the risk attitude. Three variables; 
net farm income, years of schooling and the number of 
dependents, have been successfully tested to be factors 
affecting the risk attitude. The method of testing is 
again the ordinary squares method. 
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APPENDIX A 
The shape of the E[U] curves are generally drawn as 
concave from below in most textbooks [1]. This simply 
means that the risk averse without referring to what kind 
of risk averse. As a matter of fact, there is no relation­
ship between the concave E[U] curve and the kind of risk 
averse. The concave E[U] curve is simply drawn from the 
following assumption. 
Let EU = Q(E,V) 
where 
E is the expected income 
V is the variability of income which is measured by 
Ogy or Qyg >0,. and dV/9E > 0. 
The proof of concavity of the E[U] curve can be done 
as below. 
Taking the total differential of the expression and 
equating it to zero, 
variance 
The assumptions about derivatives are 
0 = dE[U] = 11 • dE + • dV 
or 
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d ,dV\ "^^EV •*• ^E ^®VE'*'®W BV/3E) 
di (dw) = -f 7Z-r2 ] 
[Qy] 
&(##) < ° 
Therefore, the E[U] curve is concave from below. 
This concave E[U] curve has the advantage when it is 
used with the concept of the efficient frontier of the 
portfolio as it always gives the uncomplicated unique 
solution. However, this study does not aim to use the 
estimated utility function for this purpose, therefore, it 
will not pay any serious attention whether the estimated 
utility function has the concave E[U] curve or not. 
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APPENDIX B 
Let Yjj = 1.5Y be the high net farm income with the 
probability P^^, Y may be the net farm income 
of the last year or any constant number. 
Y^ = 0.5Y be the low net farm income with the 
probability Pg. 
i.e., P^ + Pg = 1 
Y = P^Yg + 
6^Y = P^(Yjj-Y)^ + PgfY^-Y^Z 
The numerical calculation is given in the following 
data. 
P]_ of P2 of 
— 2 —. 2 2 (6 2 . — Y P^ (Yg-Y) 
^2 (Y^-Y) Ô Y Y) Y 
0.9 0 .1 1 .4Y 0 .OO9Y5 0 .O8IY5 0 .090Y^ 0. 1260Y 
0.8 0 .2 1 .3Y 0 .032Y, 0 .128Y, 0 .160Y, 0. 2080Y 
0.7 0 .3 . 1 .2Y 0 .063Y, 0 .147Y, 0 .210Y, 0. 2520Y 
0.6 0 .4 1 .lY 0 .096Y^ 0 .146Y^ 0 .242Y^ 0. 2662Y 
0.5 0 .5 1 .OY 0 .1254% 0 .125Y^ 0 .2504Y^ 0. 2500Y 
0.4 0 .6 0 .9Y 0 .146Y^ 0 .096Yf 0 .242Y^ 0. 2178Y 
0.3 0 .7 0 . 8Y 0 .147Y, 0 .063Y, 0 .210Y, 0. 1690Y 
0.2 0 .8 0 .7Y 0 .128Y, 0 .032Y, 0 .160Y, 0. 1120Y 
0.1 0 .9 0 .6Y 0 .081Y 0 .009Y^ 0 . 090Y 0. 0540Y 
0.61 0 .39 1 .IIY 0. 2641Y 
0.59 0 .41 1 .09Y n 0. 2637 
0.51 0 .49 1 .OlY 0 .2499Y, 
0.49 0 .51 0 .2499Y 
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The calculation of the first row may be used as an 
example. 
Y = 0.9(1.5Y) + O.KO.SY) 
6^Y = 0.9(1.5Y - 1.4Y)2 + 0.1(0.5 - 1.4Y)^ = 0.090Y^ 
(6^Y)Y = (0.090Y^)1.4Y = 0.12604 
